UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.

18 Civ. 4145 (JPC)

PREMIUM POINT INVESTMENTS LP, ANILESHA AHUJA a/k/a NEIL AHUJA, AMIN MAJIDI, JEREMY SHOR, ASHISH DOLE, and FRANK DINUCCI, JR.,

Defendants.

[PROPOSED] FINAL JUDGMENT AS TO DEFENDANT JEREMY SHOR

The Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Commission") having filed an Amended Complaint and Defendant Jeremy Shor ("Defendant") having entered a general appearance; consented to the Court's jurisdiction over Defendant and the subject matter of this action; consented to entry of this Final Judgment; waived findings of fact and conclusions of law; and waived any right to appeal from this Final Judgment:

I.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant is permanently restrained and enjoined from violating, directly or indirectly, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) promulgated thereunder [17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5(a) and (c)], by using any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security:

- (a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; or
- (b) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, as provided in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), the foregoing paragraph also binds the following who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise: (a) Defendant's officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (b) other persons in active concert or participation with Defendant or with anyone described in (a).

II.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant is permanently restrained and enjoined from violating Sections 17(a)(1) and (3) of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act") [15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a)(1) and (3)] in the offer or sale of any security by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use of the mails, directly or indirectly:

- (a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud; or
- (b) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, as provided in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), the foregoing paragraph also binds the following who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise: (a) Defendant's officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (b) other persons in active concert or participation with Defendant or with anyone described in (a).

III.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant is permanently restrained and enjoined from violating Sections 206(1) and (2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the "Advisers Act") [15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6(1) and 80b-6(2)] from, while

acting as investment advisers, by the use of any means or instruments of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly:

- (a) employing any device, scheme, or artifices to defraud any client or prospective client; and
- (b) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, as provided in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), the foregoing paragraph also binds the following who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise: (a) Defendant's officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (b) other persons in active concert or participation with Defendant or with anyone described in (a).

IV.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendant is permanently restrained and enjoined from violating, directly or indirectly, Advisers Act Section 206(4) [15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4)] and Rule 206(4)-8(a)(2) [17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8(a)(2)] promulgated thereunder by, while acting as an investment adviser to a pooled investment vehicle, engaging in any act, practice, or course of business that is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative with respect to any investor or prospective investor in the pooled investment vehicle.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, as provided in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d)(2), the foregoing paragraph also binds the following who receive actual notice of this Final Judgment by personal service or otherwise: (a) Defendant's officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys; and (b) other persons in active concert or participation with Defendant or with anyone described in (a).

V.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, based on Defendant's sworn representations in his Statement of Financial Condition dated May 30, 2023, and other documents and information submitted to the Commission, the Court is not ordering Defendant to pay a civil penalty. The determination not to impose a civil penalty is contingent upon the accuracy and completeness of Defendant's Statement of Financial Condition. If at any time following the entry of this Final Judgment the Commission obtains information indicating that Defendant's representations to the Commission concerning his assets, income, liabilities, or net worth were fraudulent, misleading, inaccurate, or incomplete in any material respect as of the time such representations were made, the Commission may, at its sole discretion and without prior notice to Defendant, petition the Court for an order requiring Defendant to pay the maximum civil penalty allowable under the law. In connection with any such petition, the only issue shall be whether the financial information provided by Defendant was fraudulent, misleading, inaccurate, or incomplete in any material respect as of the time such representations were made. In its petition, the Commission may move this Court to consider all available remedies, including, but not limited to, ordering Defendant to pay funds or assets, directing the forfeiture of any assets, or sanctions for contempt of this Final Judgment. The Commission may also request additional discovery. Defendant may not, by way of defense to such petition: (1) challenge the validity of the Consent or this Final Judgment; (2) contest the allegations in the Amended Complaint filed by the Commission; (3) assert that payment of a civil penalty should not be ordered; (4) contest the imposition of the maximum civil penalty allowable under the law; or (5) assert any defense to liability or remedy, including, but not limited to, any statute of limitations defense.

VI.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Consent is incorporated herein with the same force and effect as if fully set forth herein, and that Defendant shall comply with all of the undertakings and agreements set forth therein.

VII.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that, solely for purposes of exceptions to discharge set forth in Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523, the allegations in the Amended Complaint are true and admitted by Defendant, and further, any debt for disgorgement, prejudgment interest, civil penalty or other amounts due by Defendant under this Final Judgment or any other judgment, order, consent order, decree or settlement agreement entered in connection with this proceeding, is a debt for the violation by Defendant of the federal securities laws or any regulation or order issued under such laws, as set forth in Section 523(a)(19) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19).

VIII.

IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that this Court shall retain jurisdiction of this matter for the purposes of enforcing the terms of this Final Judgment.

IX.

There being no just reason for delay, pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Clerk is ordered to enter this Final Judgment forthwith and without further notice.

Dated: November 7, 2023

HON. JOHN P. CRONAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

Plaintiff,

v.

18 Civ. 4145 (JPC)

PREMIUM POINT INVESTMENTS LP, ANILESHA AHUJA a/k/a NEIL AHUJA, AMIN MAJIDI, JEREMY SHOR, ASHISH DOLE, and FRANK DINUCCI, JR.,

Defendants.

CONSENT OF DEFENDANT JEREMY SHOR

- 1. Defendant Jeremy Shor ("Defendant") acknowledges having been served with the Amended Complaint in this action, enters a general appearance, and admits the Court's jurisdiction over Defendant and over the subject matter of this action.
- 2. Defendant pleaded guilty to criminal conduct relating to certain matters alleged in the Amended Complaint in this action. Specifically, in *United States v. Ahuja*, *et al.*, 18 Cr. 328 (KPF) (S.D.N.Y.), Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of securities fraud [15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78ff; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5]. In connection with that plea, Defendant admitted the facts set out in the transcript of his plea allocution that is attached as Exhibit A to this Consent.
- 3. Defendant hereby consents to the entry of the final Judgment in the form attached hereto (the "Final Judgment") and incorporated by reference herein, which, among other things, permanently restrains and enjoins Defendant from violations of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") [15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)] and Rules 10b-5(a) and (c) thereunder [17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5(a) and (c)], Sections 17(a)(1) and 17(a)(3) of the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") [15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a)(1) and (3)]; and Sections 206(1), (2), and (4)

of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ("Advisers Act") [15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6(1), 80b-6(2), and 80b-6(4)] and Rule 206(4)-8(a)(2) thereunder [17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8(a)(2)].

- 4. Defendant acknowledges that the Court is not imposing a civil penalty based on Defendant's sworn representations in Defendant's Statement of Financial Condition dated May 30, 2023, and other documents and information submitted to the Commission. Defendant further consents that if at any time following the entry of the Final Judgment the Commission obtains information indicating that Defendant's representations to the Commission concerning Defendant's assets, income, liabilities, or net worth were fraudulent, misleading, inaccurate, or incomplete in any material respect as of the time such representations were made, the Commission may, at its sole discretion and without prior notice to Defendant, petition the Court for an order requiring Defendant to pay the maximum civil penalty allowable under the law. In connection with any such petition, the only issue shall be whether the financial information provided by Defendant was fraudulent, misleading, inaccurate, or incomplete in any material respect as of the time such representations were made. In any such petition, the Commission may move the Court to consider all available remedies, including but not limited to ordering Defendant to pay funds or assets, directing the forfeiture of any assets, or sanctions for contempt of the Court's Final Judgment. The Commission may also request additional discovery. Defendant may not, by way of defense to such petition: (1) challenge the validity of this Consent or the Final Judgment; (2) contest the allegations in the Amended Complaint; (3) assert that payment of a civil penalty should not be ordered; (4) contest the imposition of the maximum civil penalty allowable under the law; or (5) assert any defense to liability or remedy, including but not limited to any statute of limitations defense.
- 5. Defendant waives the entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

- 6. Defendant waives the right, if any, to a jury trial and to appeal from the entry of the Final Judgment.
- 7. Defendant enters into this Consent voluntarily and represents that no threats, offers, promises, or inducements of any kind have been made by the Commission or any member, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the Commission to induce Defendant to enter into this Consent.
- 8. Defendant agrees that this Consent shall be incorporated into the Final Judgment with the same force and effect as if fully set forth therein.
- 9. Defendant will not oppose the enforcement of the Final Judgment on the ground, if any exists, that it fails to comply with Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby waives any objection based thereon.
- 10. Defendant waives service of the Final Judgment and agrees that entry of the Final Judgment by the Court and filing with the Clerk of the Court will constitute notice to Defendant of its terms and conditions. Defendant further agrees to provide counsel for the Commission, within thirty days after the Final Judgment is filed with the Clerk of the Court, with an affidavit or declaration stating that Defendant has received and read a copy of the Final Judgment.
- against Defendant in this civil proceeding. Defendant acknowledges that no promise or representation has been made by the Commission or any member, officer, employee, agent, or representative of the Commission with regard to any criminal liability that may have arisen or may arise from the facts underlying this action or immunity from any such criminal liability. Defendant waives any claim of Double Jeopardy based upon the settlement of this proceeding, including the imposition of any remedy or civil penalty herein. Defendant further acknowledges that the Court's entry of a permanent injunction may have collateral consequences under federal or state law and

the rules and regulations of self-regulatory organizations, licensing boards, and other regulatory organizations. Such collateral consequences include, but are not limited to, a statutory disqualification with respect to membership or participation in, or association with a member of, a self-regulatory organization. This statutory disqualification has consequences that are separate from any sanction imposed in an administrative proceeding. In addition, in any disciplinary proceeding before the Commission based on the entry of the injunction in this action, Defendant understands that he shall not be permitted to contest the factual allegations of the Amended Complaint in this action.

12. Defendant understands and agrees to comply with the terms of 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(e), which provides in part that it is the Commission's policy "not to permit a defendant or respondent to consent to a judgment or order that imposes a sanction while denying the allegations in the complaint or order for proceedings." As part of Defendant's agreement to comply with the terms of Section 202.5(e), Defendant acknowledges the guilty plea for related conduct described in paragraph 2 above, and: (i) will not take any action or make or permit to be made any public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any allegation in the Amended Complaint or creating the impression that the Amended Complaint is without factual basis; (ii) will not make or permit to be made any public statement to the effect that Defendant does not admit the allegations of the Amended Complaint, or that this Consent contains no admission of the allegations, without also stating that Defendant does not deny the allegations; (iii) upon the filing of this Consent, Defendant hereby withdraws any papers filed in this action to the extent that they deny any allegation in the Amended Complaint; and (iv) stipulates solely for purposes of exceptions to discharge set forth in Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523, that the allegations in the Amended Complaint are true, and further, that any debt for disgorgement, prejudgment interest, civil penalty or other amounts due by Defendant under the Final Judgment or any other judgment, order,

consent order, decree or settlement agreement entered in connection with this proceeding, is a debt for the violation by Defendant of the federal securities laws or any regulation or order issued under such laws, as set forth in Section 523(a)(19) of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19). If Defendant breaches this agreement, the Commission may petition the Court to vacate the Final Judgment and restore this action to its active docket. Nothing in this paragraph affects Defendant's: (i) testimonial obligations; or (ii) right to take legal or factual positions in litigation or other legal proceedings in which the Commission is not a party.

- 13. Defendant hereby waives any rights under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, or any other provision of law to seek from the United States, or any agency, or any official of the United States acting in his or her official capacity, directly or indirectly, reimbursement of attorney's fees or other fees, expenses, or costs expended by Defendant to defend against this action. For these purposes, Defendant agrees that Defendant is not the prevailing party in this action since the parties have reached a good faith settlement.
- 14. Defendant agrees to waive all objections, including but not limited to, constitutional, timeliness, and procedural objections, to the administrative proceeding that will be instituted when the Final Judgment is entered.
- 15. Defendant agrees that the Commission may present the Final Judgment to the Court for signature and entry without further notice.

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Defendant agrees that this Court shall retain jurisdiction over this matter for the

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MARINA ZAPIEUM CHIDIC NOTARY PUBLIC, STATFING STEMP OR SITES: NO. 01ZA6181785 QUALIFIED IN QUEENS COUNTY COMMISSION EXPIRES FEBRUARY 11, 2024

Exhibit A

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UNITED STATES DIST SOUTHERN DISTRICT	OF NEW YORK	
UNITED STATES OF A		
V .		18 Cr. 328 (KPF)
ANILESH AHUJA and	JEREMY SHOR,	
Def	endants.	
		Sentence
	x	
		New York, N.Y. April 22, 2022 11:00 a.m.
Before:		
	HON. KATHERINE	POLK FAILLA.
		District Judge
	APPEARAI	-
Southern Dist BY: ANDREA M. GRI DANIEL M. GIT	Attorney for the rict of New Yorles	ne K
PAUL, WEISS, RIFKI	ND, WHARTON & GA	ARRISON, LLP (NYC)
Attorneys for BY: RICHARD C. TA	Defendant Ahuja RLOWE	
ROBERTO FINZI -AND-		
PAUL WEISS (NY) Attorneys for BY: DAVID FRIEDMA	Defendant Ahuja	a
DI. DAVID ENIEDMA	TA	

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                             APPEARANCES (Continued)
2
      KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP (NYC)
3
           Attorneys for Defendant Ahuja
      BY: JOHN P. DEL MONACO
 4
      WEDDLE LAW PLLC
5
           Attorneys for Defendant Shor
      BY: JUSTIN S. WEDDLE
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           JULIA I. CATANIA
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      Also Present: Todd Kaneshiro, FBI Special Agent
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1	(Case called)		
2	MS. GRISWOLD: Good morning, your Honor.		
3	Andrea Griswold for the government.		
4	Mr. Gitner will introduce himself. We are also joined		
5	by Special Agent Todd Kaneshiro.		
6	MR. GITNER: Good morning, your Honor.		
7	David Gitner for the government.		
8	THE COURT: Good morning. Thank you. We have a number		
9	of folks introducing themselves.		
10	Mr. Tarlowe, I'll begin with you being you were the		
11	first to stand.		
12	MR. TARLOWE: Yes, your Honor.		
13	Richard Tarlowe and Roberto Finzi on behalf of		
14	Mr. Ahuja. Mr. Ahuja is here as well, and we're also joined by		
15	our colleague David Friedman, as well as John Del Monaco from		
16	Kirkland & Ellis.		
17	THE COURT: Good morning to each of you.		
18	Mr. Ahuja, good morning to you, sir.		
19	DEFENDANT AHUJA: Good morning, your Honor.		
20	THE COURT: Mr. Weddle.		
21	MR. WEDDLE: Good morning, your Honor.		
22	Justin Weddle and Julia Catania from Weddle Law PLLC,		
23	and I'm sitting next to my client Mr. Shor.		
24	THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Shor, good morning to you		
25	as well.		

I appreciate you all wearing masks because of your proximity to each other. I'm far enough away from you that I'm not wearing one.

Let me talk to you first about a first couple of housekeeping matters, please. With the masks and with a recent, I'll put in quotes, upgrade to the technology of this courtroom, it is sometime difficult to hear what's going on. If you find it easier to remain seated when you are speaking with me, that's fine by me, just please bring the microphone close to you.

Mr. Tarlowe and Mr. Finzi, it was my expectation that I would be conducting a plea proceeding at the same time as to both defendants.

Is that your understanding as well?

MR. TARLOWE: Yes, your Honor. We think that makes sense.

THE COURT: Mr. Weddle, the same?

MR. WEDDLE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. As many hundreds of pleas as I have done as a judge and a prosecutor, this is my first 11(c)(1)(C) plea. And in hoping to get it right, I looked at some past ones and only found a transcript to one. In that case, the sentencing was all one just paragraph where the judge just said, all right, basically go forward and say no more.

I'd like to have a sense from the parties as to degree

to which I am speaking about the requirements of Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. For example, there have been PSRs prepared. I believe there will be at least some to them, and there will be certainly modifications to the judgments in this case. But if I can be colloquial with you, how much Rule 32 do you want at sentencing?

For example, am I inquiring as to your client's respective reviews of the PSR? Will there be written -- or excuse me, oral sentencing statements to me, or will the parties be simply incorporating that which they said to me at the original sentencing, plus whatever is embodied in the respective plea agreement?

I just want to know because I don't want to -- I want to do this correctly, and I know how to do a sentencing, but this is an unusual sentencing to do.

Ms. Griswold, what is the government's contemplation of what sentencing looks like in this case?

MS. GRISWOLD: Thank you, your Honor.

We believe that the Court can rely on the record from the prior proceeding and that we don't need a fulsome Rule 32 inquiry, so long as the defendants are in agreement with that and are not requesting the inquiry be done again. And we would not expect to be advocating or arguing at length as to the sentencing.

THE COURT: At all?

MS. GRISWOLD: If your Honor would indulge us, we have a very brief statement that I believe Mr. Gitner will offer when we get there.

THE COURT: I will keep that in mind. Thank you.

Mr. Tarlowe, I should have asked. You just happen to be in my line of vision. Am I directing the questions to you or Mr. Finzi this morning?

MR. WEDDLE: I think to me, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, then I just have, towards sentencing?

MR. TARLOWE: We're in agreement with the government. We think it's appropriate for the Court to rely on the existing record, and we don't think there's any need, unless the Court has questions, which obviously we're happy to address, but absent any additional questions, we don't think there's a need to supplement the current record.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Weddle.

MR. WEDDLE: I agree with Mr. Tarlowe's position on this. And of course, I've spoken to Mr. Shor and he understands he has a right to be heard, and our plan is to have him not be heard here at the sentencing proceeding. I think we'll have to see what the government's statement is with respect to sentencing, but we were planning to say nothing beyond what's already in the record, your Honor.

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THE COURT: Understood. Perhaps what I'll do then is I'll simply give you and your respective clients an opportunity to be heard, understanding that you may waive that right. And I will ask for your assistance, it would be my preference to do this particular proceeding once and not twice. I imagine you have the same views, so working together I'm sure we will get this right.

Mr. Tarlowe, may I speak directly with your client?

MR. WEDDLE: Yes, of course, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

And, Mr. Weddle, may I speak directly with your client?

MR. WEDDLE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. I appreciate your standing.

Mr. Ahuja, begin withing you. It is my understanding, sir, that today you wish to enter a plea of guilty to Count Three of the indictment in this case which charges you with securities fraud.

It is that correct, sir?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, it is.

THE COURT: And that plea today, I understand, is going to be entered pursuant to a plea agreement with the government. Is that also correct?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes.

THE COURT: Thank you. You're welcome to be seated.

Mr. Shor, the same two questions. You and I both know about the trial. We were both there. It is my understanding, sir, that in lieu of a second trial in this case, it is your wish today to plead to Count Three of the indictment charging you with securities fraud. Am I correct

DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And, Mr. Shor, is that plea entered pursuant to a plea agreement? It will be entered pursuant to a written plea agreement with the government.

DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: You're also welcome to be seated.

Gentleman, before I can accept your guilty pleas, I need to you ask a series of questions.

Let me speak to you about what purposes generally these questions serve. The first thing that I would like to do is to ensure that you are competent to enter a plea of guilty, that you can see and hear and understand what is going on in this courtroom.

After that, I would like to review with you the rights that you have and that you would be waiving or giving up by entering a guilty plea. I'd like to speak to you about the charge to which each of you proposes to plead guilty, and the defenses — excuse me, the penalties associated with that charge, and then I intend to ask each of you what it is you did that makes you believe that you are guilty of this offense.

What I'd like to underscore today, because I know you all for so many years, I think I can say this easily, most important thing is that you understand what is happening in this courtroom. If any question that I ask you is confusing or if for any reason either of you wishes to speak with your attorney, just let me know and we'll pause and we'll take whatever time you need to be clear as to the question that I'm asking or the response that you wish to give.

If I don't hear from you, I will understand that you are understanding my question and are prepared to answer.

What I'm going to do now is I'm going to have my deputy Ms. Noriega swear both of you in. Thank you.

(Defendants sworn)

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Mr. Ahuja, please state and spell your full name.

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Anilesh Ahuja, A-N-I-L-E-S-H, A-H-U-J-A.

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Thank you.

Mr. Shor, please state and spell your full name.

DEFENDANT SHOR: Jeremy Andrew Shor, J-E-R-E-M-Y, A-N-D-R-E-W, last name Shor, S-H-O-R.

THE COURT: Mr. Ahuja and Mr. Shor, the significance of my having placed you under oath is that if you answer any of the questions that I'm about to ask you falsely, you may be prosecuted for a separate offense known as perjury.

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As I hinted at I hope at the beginning of this proceeding, my intent is to ask these questions once and then turn to each of you.

And Mr. Shor, I know you'll take no offense, I'm looking at Mr. Ahuja first because he's on my left. If the roles were reversed, I'd look at you first. I really don't think you care enough being the first or second person to answer, and I appreciate you nodding that you do not.

Mr. Ahuja, do you understand the significance of being placed under oath?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes.

THE COURT: Mr. Shor?

DEFENDANT SHOR: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: And again, I take no offense if you wish to remain seated, so long as the microphones are brought closer to you. I will let you decide what is most comfortable for you. All that I care about and that the reporter cares about is that we hear you.

Mr. Ahuja, how old are you?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Fifty-four.

THE COURT: How far did you go in school, sir?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: I have undergrad degree in

23 | economics.

THE COURT: Mr. Shor, how old are you, sir?

DEFENDANT SHOR: I'm 50 years old.

THE COURT: And how far did you go in school, sir?

DEFENDANT SHOR: I have a Ph.D.

THE COURT: This question or this discussion is really directed more to counsel. Counsel, in connection with each of the sentencings in this case, I was given information about medical and/or mental health issues regarding each of the defendants in this case.

Assuming you agree, I would not actually require them to site any condition they may have on the record. What I would do instead is to recognize that I have looked at and refreshed my recollection as to any medical or mental health conditions they may have cited to me in connection with their sentencing, and simply to ask whether as a result of those conditions or any medication they are taking for them, they have any difficulty seeing, hearing or understanding.

Mr. Tarlowe, is that acceptable to you?

MR. TARLOWE: Yes, your Honor, it is.

THE COURT: Mr. Weddle?

MR. WEDDLE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Ahuja, you know about any medical or mental health conditions that you may have and the medications that you are taking for them. My question to you this morning, sir, is whether any of those conditions or the medications you may take for them causes you any difficulty in seeing or hearing or

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1	understanding these proceedings?
2	DEFENDANT AHUJA: No, your Honor.
3	THE COURT: Mr. Shor, the same question. Is there any
4	condition that you have or medication that you are taking that
5	impairs in any way your ability to see or hear or understand
6	these proceedings?
7	DEFENDANT SHOR: No, your Honor.
8	THE COURT: Mr. Ahuja, have you ever been treated or
9	hospitalized for any form of addiction, including drug or
10	alcohol addiction?
11	DEFENDANT AHUJA: No, your Honor.
12	THE COURT: Mr. Shor?
13	DEFENDANT SHOR: I have, your Honor.
14	THE COURT: And is there anything about right now
15	today, is there anything about any treatment protocol you may
16	have received in the past that would impair your ability to
17	see, to hear or to understand what is happening today?
18	DEFENDANT SHOR: There is not, your Honor.
19	THE COURT: Thank you.
20	Mr. Ahuja, in the past two days, have you taken any
21	drug or medicine or pill that would impair your ability to
22	understand these proceedings?
23	DEFENDANT AHUJA: No, your Honor.
24	THE COURT: Mr. Shor, the same question?
25	DEFENDANT SHOR: No, your Honor.

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1	THE COURT: Mr. Ahuja, is your mind clear this		
2	morning, sir?		
3	DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.		
4	THE COURT: You understand what is happenings in these		
5	proceedings?		
6	DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.		
7	THE COURT: Mr. Shor, is your mind clear today, sir?		
8	DEFENDANT SHOR: Crystal, your Honor.		
9	THE COURT: And, sir, do you understand what is		
10	happening in these proceedings?		
11	DEFENDANT SHOR: I do, your Honor.		
12	THE COURT: Mr. Tarlowe, have you had a sufficient		
13	opportunity along with your colleagues to discuss this matter		
14	with Mr. Ahuja?		
15	MR. TARLOWE: Yes, your Honor, we have.		
16	THE COURT: Do you believe he understands the rights		
17	that he has and would be waiving by entering a plea of guilty?		
18	MR. TARLOWE: Yes.		
19	THE COURT: Do you believe him capable of		
20	understanding the nature of these proceedings?		
21	MR. TARLOWE: Yes.		
22	THE COURT: Mr. Tarlowe, do you have any doubt as to		
23	Mr. Ahuja's competence to enter a plea of guilty if that's what		
24	he wishes to do?		
25	MR. TARLOWE: No, your Honor.		

THE COURT: Mr. Weddle, have you had a sufficient opportunity along with your colleague to discuss this matter with Mr. Shor?

MR. WEDDLE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you believe he understands the rights that he has and would be waiving by entering a plea of guilty?

MR. WEDDLE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you believe he is capable of understanding these proceedings?

MR. WEDDLE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: If your client wishes to plead guilty, do you have any doubt as to his competence to do so?

MR. WEDDLE: I do not, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Griswold, do you have any doubt as to either defendants' competence to plead guilty if he wishes to do so?

MS. GRISWOLD: I do not.

THE COURT: Mr. Ahuja and Mr. Shor, based on our discussions this morning, which would include both your answers to my questions and my observations of your demeanor here in court, and based as well on the conversations that I've had with your attorneys and with the attorney for the government, I find that you are fully competent to enter an informed plea of quilty if you wish to do so.

I'm going to ask you a few questions about the

M4MBAHUP indictment in this case. And let me explain to both of you that from time to time I will be asking about discussions that you've had with your attorney.

When I do so, I'm not asking for the details of those communications. I'm not trying at all to invade the attorney/client privilege. What I'm doing is trying to ensure that certain topic matters were covered by your attorney with you, so please keep that in mind when I ask these questions.

I begin by asking, Mr. Ahuja, have you read the indictment in this case?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Shor?

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DEFENDANT SHOR: I have, your Honor.

THE COURT: And have you, Mr. Ahuja, had the sufficient opportunity to speak with your attorney about the charge to which you intend to plead guilty and any defenses that you may have to that charge?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Shor?

DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Without giving me the details of the communication, has your attorneys explained to you the consequences of entering a plea of guilty?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Are you satisfied with your attorneys' representation of you in this matter?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: What I will do now, gentleman, is to speak with you about certain Constitutional rights that you have and that you would be waiving or giving up by entering a guilty plea.

I appreciate your attention thus far, and I imagine you will continue to pay attention, and please let me know if there's anything that is unclear or any reason why you wish to speak with your attorneys before answering.

Under the Constitution and laws of the United States, you have the right to continue with your plea of not guilty to all of the charges contained in the indictment.

Do you understand that, Mr. Ahuja?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Shor?

DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: If you continued with your plea of not guilty, you would be entitled to a speedy and public trial by a jury on the charges contained in the indictment in this case.

Do you understand that, sir?

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DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.

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THE COURT: At a trial, you would be presumed to be innocent, and the government would be required to prove you guilty by competent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt before you could be found guilty.

Do you understand that, sir?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: A jury of 12 people would have to agree unanimously that you were guilty of the offenses charged in the indictment. You would not have to prove that you were innocent if you were to proceed to trial.

Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: At a trial and at every stage of your prosecution, you are entitled to the assistance of an attorney. If and to the extent that you cannot afford one, one would be appointed for you at public expense, free of cost to you in order to represent you.

Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

DEFENDANT SHOR: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: At a trial, the witnesses for the government would have to come to court and testify in your presence. Your attorney could cross-examine the witnesses for

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the government. Your attorneys could object to evidence offered by the government, and they could offer evidence on your behalf if you wanted them to do so.

You would also have the right to have subpoenas issued or other documents or process used in order to compel witnesses to testify in your defense.

Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

DEFENDANT SHOR: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: At a trial, you would have a right to testify if you wanted to do so, and you would have the right not to testify if you wanted not to do so.

If you decided not to testify, no one, including the jury, could draw any inference or suggestion of guilt from your decision not to testify.

Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Another consequence of entering a guilty plea in this particular fashion is that you waive or give up your right to seek suppression or exclusion of the government's evidence against you. Are you aware of that?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Have you had a sufficient opportunity to

discuss with your attorneys whether there is a basis to seek suppression of part or all of the government's evidence against you?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you understand that if you were convicted after a trial, you would have the right to appeal from the jury's verdict?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

DEFENDANT SHOR: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you understand also that even now as you are entering this guilty plea, you have the right to change your mind and to proceed with your previously entered pleas of not guilty and to go to trial on the charges contained in this indictment?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: If you plead guilty and if I accept your guilty plea, you will give up your right to trial and the other rights that I've been discussing with you, other than your right to an attorney, because you have the right to an attorney whether you plead guilty or go to trial.

But if you plead guilty and if I accept your guilty plea, there will be no trial and I will enter a judgment of guilty, and I will sentence you based on your plea today and

whatever discussions we have regarding the sentencing proceedings today.

Mr. Ahuja, do you understand that?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

DEFENDANT SHOR: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: If you plead guilty, there is also a degree to which you will have to give up your right not to incriminate yourself, because I will ask you questions later in this proceeding to confirm for myself that you are pleading guilty because you are in fact guilty of this offense charged in Count Three and not for some other reason. You will have to admit and acknowledge your guilt of the offense charged in Count Three.

Do you understand that?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Ahuja, do you understand the rights that I have been discussing with you for the past few minutes?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Is it your wish today to give up your right for trial and the other rights that I've been discussing with you and enter a plea of guilty?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Shor, do you understand each of the rights that I've been discussing with you?

DEFENDANT SHOR: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: Is it your wish today, sir, to give up your right to trial and the other rights that I've been discussing with you and enter a plea of guilty to Count Three of the indictment.

DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm now speaking to both of you. You are charged in Count Three with securities fraud, and that is in violation of Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78j(b) and 78ff, Title 17, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 240.10(b)(5), and Title 18, United States Code, Section 2. I ask you to listen to me now because I'm going to outline for you the elements of offense of securities fraud.

If this case were to proceed to trial, the government would have to prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First, that in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, you employed a scheme, device or artifice to defraud or made an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact which made what was said under the circumstances misleading, or engaged in an act, practice or course of business that operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon a purchaser or seller.

Second, that you acted knowingly, willfully and with the intent to defraud; and third, that you knowingly used or

caused to be used any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or the use of the mails in furtherance of the fraudulent conduct.

The government would also be required to prove venue by a preponderance of the evidence.

Do you understand, Mr. Ahuja, that if you were to go to trial, that is what the government would have to prove at trial?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Shor?

DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: What I would like to do now, gentleman, is to speak to you about the maximum possible penalties that are associated with Count Three of the indictment, and I'm using the term "maximum" deliberately. I mean the most that could possibly be imposed. This is not to suggest that this is what you're necessarily going to receive, but I just want to make sure you understood what the maximum penalties were. And I'm going to begin by discussing possible restrictions on your liberty.

The maximum term of imprisonment for the offense charged in Count Three is 20 years imprisonment.

Do you understand that, Mr. Ahuja?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Shor, do you understand that?

DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Any term of imprisonment could be followed by a term of up to three years of supervised release, and let me just explain to you both what I mean when I use the term "supervised release." It is a period of time where one is subject to supervision by the United States probation office. There would be terms and conditions of supervised release that one would have to follow.

If the person were to violate the terms and conditions of supervised release, the possibility exists that that person could be sent to prison without a jury trial to serve time on the violation of supervised release. If that were the case, they would get no credit for the time that had served on any prior prison sentence. They would get no credit for time spent on post-release supervision in compliance with the terms of supervised release.

Mr. Ahuja, do you understand what I'm saying on the concept of supervised release?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Shor?

DEFENDANT SHOR: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: Please understand as well, there is no parole in the federal system. If you were sentence to a term of imprisonment, you would not be released early on parole.

There is an opportunity to earn credit for good behavior and

that amount tends to vary, so I say as an average that for terms of imprisonment, one would have to serve approximately 85 percent of the term to which they are sentenced.

Mr. Ahuja, do you understand that?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Shor?

DEFENDANT SHOR: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: In addition to potential restrictions on your liberty, the maximum possible punishment also includes certain financial penalties.

The maximum allowable fine is the greatest of these three things; \$5 million, twice the gross pecuniary gain derived from the offense, or twice the gross pecuniary loss to persons other than yourself. I must order a mandatory special assessment of \$100 per count of conviction.

In certain circumstances, there may be restitution obligations if there are individuals who are injured or entities that are injured, and there are other circumstances of forfeiture obligations. I do not believe either is appropriate today.

Mr. Ahuja, do you understand that these potential restrictions on your liberty and these potential financial penalties are the maximum possible penalties associated with the Count Three offense?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

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1	THE COURT: Mr. Shor?		
2	DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.		
3	THE COURT: Gentleman, I'm going to ask you questions.		
4	And my experience is that not all of these questions are		
5	applicable to everyone. I do want to make sure, however, that		
6	I ask them, and I will begin by asking, Mr. Ahuja, are you a		
7	United States citizen?		
8	DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, I am.		
9	THE COURT: Were you born here or naturalized?		
10	DEFENDANT AHUJA: I was naturalized, your Honor.		
11	THE COURT: In certain circumstances, though I don't		
12	believe in this one, a guilty plea can have adverse immigration		
13	consequences, including the possibility of detention by		
14	immigration authorities or removal or deportation from the		
15	United States.		
16	Have you had an opportunity to discuss with your		
17	attorneys whether there might be any immigration consequences		
18	as result of this guilty plea?		
19	DEFENDANT AHUJA: I have, your Honor.		
20	THE COURT: Is it still your wish today, sir, to plead		
21	guilty?		
22	DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.		
23	THE COURT: Mr. Shor, are you a United States?		
24	DEFENDANT SHOR: I am, your Honor.		
25	THE COURT: Were you born here, sir?		

DEFENDANT SHOR: I was, your Honor.

THE COURT: Then I will ask you a different set of questions, and you're welcome to stand if you like and I'll just ask Mr. Ahuja them in a moment.

Do you understand that as a result of this guilty plea, you could lose certain valuable civil rights, to the extent that you have them today or could obtain them in the future. These would include the right to vote, the right to hold public office, the right to serve on a jury and the right to possess a firearm.

DEFENDANT SHOR: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you. You're welcome to be seated, sir.

Mr. Ahuja, you just heard me review with Mr. Shor the potential civil consequences of a guilty plea. Were you able to hear me, sir?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Are you aware that as a result of your guilty plea, you also might lose these civil rights?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And it is still your wish to go forward?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Tarlowe, it is my understanding that there are no other outstanding prosecutions of Mr. Ahuja; am I correct?

M4MBAHUP 1 MR. TARLOWE: Yes, your Honor, that is correct. THE COURT: Is there an outstanding SEC proceeding? 2 3 MR. TARLOWE: There is, Judge. 4 THE COURT: Thank you. And, Mr. Weddle, the same two questions? 5 6 MR. WEDDLE: Same answers, your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Thank you. 8 Mr. Ahuja, please understand that resolving the case 9 before me doesn't resolve any other matters that you may have, 10 including any parallel proceedings in this case. 11 Do you understand that, sir? 12 DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor. 13 THE COURT: And, Mr. Shor, do you understand? 14 DEFENDANT SHOR: I do, your Honor. 15 THE COURT: Mr. Ahuja, this is a bit of an unusual 16 case given the manner in which it is being resolved, but I 17 would still like to know whether you have discussed the process 18 of sentencing with your attorneys? 19 DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, I have, your Honor. 20 THE COURT: And you and I have already been together

for a prior sentencing proceeding, so my understanding is that you are familiar with the obligations that I have and the considerations that I undertake in imposing an individualized sentence; is that correct?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

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THE COURT: Mr. Shor, do you recall as well speaking with your attorneys about the process of sentencing?

DEFENDANT SHOR: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: And we have gone through the process once before, so you have familiarity with my obligations and the role that each of us plays at sentencing?

DEFENDANT SHOR: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Ahuja, I understand that there is a written plea agreement entered into between you and your attorneys and the attorneys for the government; is that correct?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: In connection with this proceeding, I've been given a letter dated March 9 of 2022 from Ms. Griswold and Mr. Gitner to your attorneys Mr. Finzi and Mr. Tarlowe and Mr. Friedman. It has the docket number of this case, your name, and I'm going to hold up a copy, but I'll ask, do you have a copy of that document, sir?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: I can see it from here. We see it is the same thing, sir. I'm marking my copy as Court Exhibit 1 just so that you understand.

The copy that I have, sir, has six pages. Perhaps yours also has six pages?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, it does, your Honor.

	M4MBAHUP
1	THE COURT: Can I ask you please to turn to page 6,
2	sir?
3	DEFENDANT AHUJA: I'm there, your Honor.
4	THE COURT: On the version that I have, I have four
5	signatures. Does your page 6 also have four signatures on it,
6	sir?
7	DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, it does, your Honor.
8	THE COURT: Is one of those signatures yours?
9	DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, it is, your Honor.
10	THE COURT: Did you sign this document in or about the
11	last day or so in the presence of your attorney?
12	DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.
13	THE COURT: Before you signed this document, did you
14	read it?
15	DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, I did, your Honor.
16	THE COURT: If you had any questions about it, were
17	you able to resolve those issues with your attorney?
18	DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.
19	THE COURT: At the time you signed this document, did
20	you understand what it provided?
21	DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.
22	THE COURT: And just to reiterate, you understand this
23	to be your written plea agreement with the government?
24	DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.
25	THE COURT: Mr. Shor, I also have a letter also dated

M4MBAHUP			
March 9 of 2022, to Mr. Weddle from the United States			
Attorney's Office, Ms. Griswold and Mr. Gitner. It contains as			
well a reference to your name and the docket number in this			
case. Do you have a copy of that document in front of you,			
sir?			
DEFENDANT SHOR: I do, your Honor.			
THE COURT: I see that is the same document.			
Sir, is this your plea agreement with the government?			
DEFENDANT SHOR: I believe so, your Honor.			
THE COURT: I'll ask you to confirm with your attorney			
that it is.			
DEFENDANT SHOR: It is, your Honor.			
THE COURT: Sir, I've marked this as Court Exhibit 2,			
and I'm going to ask you, please, to turn to the last page of			
this document, which I see you are at already. It is for both			
of us page 6.			
Are there four signatures on your version of this			
document, sir?			
DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.			
THE COURT: Is one of them yours?			
DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.			
THE COURT: Did you sign this today in the presence of			
your attorney?			
DEFENDANT SHOR: I did not, your Honor.			
THE COURT: Did you sign this yesterday, sir?			

M4MBAHUP 1 DEFENDANT SHOR: I signed it yesterday. THE COURT: I see that it was signed today. 2 3 Before you signed this document, did you read it? 4 DEFENDANT SHOR: I did, your Honor. 5 THE COURT: To the extent you had any questions about 6 it, were you able to resolve those by speaking with your 7 attorneys? 8 DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor. 9 THE COURT: At the time that you signed this document, 10 did you understand its contents? 11 DEFENDANT SHOR: I did, your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. 12 13 One of the features of each of these agreements is 14 that you have agreed on the guidelines range that applies in 15 this case, and this is my understanding. You are agreeing that the guidelines range that's calculated at your prior sentencing 16 17 proceeding adjusted to a count for acceptance of responsibility 18 can be used for today's purposes. 19 Mr. Shor, do I understand that correctly? 20 DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor. 21 THE COURT: I'm sorry, Mr. Ahuja. I knew I was going 22 to do that. I won't do it again. Thank you, sir. I'll look at 23 you and say the right name. 24 Is that in fact your understanding of this agreement?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

M4MBAHUP THE COURT: Mr. Shor? 1 2 DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Thank you. 4 And so let me ask the parties, there's a discussion 5 about the accounting for acceptance of responsibility. Perhaps 6 this is an academic issue. It was my intent to reduce by three 7 levels, because even though there was a trial in this case, I'm being advised well before a second trial of the desire to plead 8 9 quilty. 10 But let me please ask counsel if they have a different 11 view as to the appropriate acceptance credit? 12 MS. GRISWOLD: We agree, your Honor, it should be 13 three points. 14 THE COURT: Mr. Tarlowe? 15 MR. TARLOWE: We agree. THE COURT: And Mr. Weddle? 16 17 MR. WEDDLE: We agree. 18 THE COURT: Mr. Ahuja, the sentence guidelines were previously calculated at 262 to 327 months. With a three-level 19 20 reduction for acceptance of responsibility, they are 21 recalculated as 188 to 235 months.

At Mr. Shor's sentencing proceeding, the guidelines were calculated as 168 to 210 months. And with a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, they are now recalculated as 121 to 151 months.

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Mr. Ahuja, in your plea agreement you and the government have agreed upon a sentence, and that sentence is a sentence of time served with no following term of supervised release, no fine, no forfeiture and no restitution.

Is that your understanding of the sentence to which you have agreed with the government?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, it is, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you understand, sir, that because this proceeding and this plea agreement are both being done under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), I may accept or reject your plea agreement.

Do you have that understanding?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: If I accept your plea agreement, I am required to impose the sentence that you and the government have agreed to and that I have just described.

Do you understand that, sir?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you also understand that if I reject the agreement, you would have the right to withdraw your guilty plea?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: I also understand that you and the government have agreed that if I were to reject your plea agreement or you were to withdraw your guilty plea, the plea

agreement that we've been talking about and that I've marked as Court Exhibit 1 will become null and void.

Do you understand that, sir?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: In your plea agreement, you are waiving your right to appeal or otherwise challenge a sentence of time served and a special assessment that is less than or equal to \$100.

In other words, if I sentence you to time served and if I order a special assessment of \$100 or something less than that, you would have no right to appeal or otherwise challenge those components of that sentence.

Do you understand that, sir?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Shor, let me please turn to you.

You also have entered into a plea agreement pursuant to the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), you and the government have agreed upon the same sentence that I just previewed with Mr. Ahuja, which is a sentence of time served, no term of supervised release, no fine, no forfeiture and no restitution.

Is that your understanding of the sentence to which you and the government have agreed?

DEFENDANT SHOR: It is, your Honor.

THE COURT: And under Rule 11(c)(1)(C), I may accept

or reject your plea agreement.

And just to reiterate what I said with Mr. Ahuja, if I accept the plea agreement, I am required to impose the sentence to which you and the government have agreed and that I've just described. And if I reject your plea agreement, you will have the right to withdraw your guilty plea.

Do you understand each of those things, sir?

DEFENDANT SHOR: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: Please also understand that you and the government have agreed that if I reject your plea agreement or if you were to withdraw your guilty plea, the plea agreement will become null and void.

Do you understand that, sir?

DEFENDANT SHOR: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: In your plea agreement -- and perhaps what I should have done is just -- this is on page -- for me page 3 of the plea agreement. It looks like page 3 for each of you. It's the first of the other provisions, and it is a series of waivers. So perhaps I should have asked this.

Mr. Shor, have you read this paragraph of the plea agreement?

DEFENDANT SHOR: I have, your Honor.

THE COURT: And you understand, sir, that in this paragraph, you have waived your right to appeal or otherwise challenge a sentence of time served and/or a special assessment

that is less than or equal to \$100.

So if I were to sentence you to time serve and order a special assessment of \$100 or less, you would have no right to appeal or otherwise to challenge those components of your sentence. Is that correct?

DEFENDANT SHOR: That's correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Ahuja, I should have asked you a moment ago, sir, whether you understood these provisions. I could point them out to you in the agreement. I see that you're looking at them as I'm talking to you.

Do you know specifically the paragraph to which I was referring when I asked you those questions

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Griswold, are there specific provisions of this plea agreement that you would like me to call to the attention of either defendant in this case?

MS. GRISWOLD: No, your Honor, not other than what you've already done with respect to the appellate waiver.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Ahuja, does this plea agreement that I've marked as Court Exhibit 1 constitute your complete and total understanding of the entire agreement that you have with the government?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Sir, has anything been left out of this

M4MBAHUP agreement to the best of your knowledge? 1 2 DEFENDANT AHUJA: No, your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Other than what's contained in this 4 agreement, has anyone made you any promise or offered you any 5 type of inducement in order to get you to sign this agreement 6 or to plead quilty in this case? 7 DEFENDANT AHUJA: No, your Honor. THE COURT: Has anyone forced you or threatened you to 8 9 sign this agreement or to plead guilty in this case? 10 DEFENDANT AHUJA: No, your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Mr. Shor, does your written plea agreement 12 which has been marked as Court Exhibit 2 constitute your 13 complete and total understanding of the entire agreement that 14 you have with the government? 15 DEFENDANT SHOR: It does, your Honor. THE COURT: To the best of your knowledge, sir, has 16 17 anything been left out? 18 DEFENDANT SHOR: No, your Honor. THE COURT: Other than what's contained in this 19 20 agreement, has anyone made you any promise or offered you any 21 type of inducement in order to get you to sign this agreement 22 or to plead quilty here today? 23 DEFENDANT SHOR: No, your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Has anyone threatened you or forced you to 25 sign this agreement or to plead guilty here today?

DEFENDANT SHOR: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Ahuja, just in the interest of completeness, we've been talking about various provisions of the agreements and I see that in addition to the ones that I specifically discussed with you, there is an agreement that the parties have that if this plea were entered into and accepted, there would be the withdrawal of certain appeals currently at the United States Court Of appeals for the Second Circuit.

That is on page 2 of the agreement in the paragraph that begins, "It is further agreed." May I direct your attention to that page, sir. You're there. Thank you.

Mr. Ahuja, is it in fact the case that upon acceptance of the plea and this agreement by the district court, the parties will be executing stipulations regarding the dismissal of the two appeals or the withdrawal of the two appeals?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Have I misstated it?

MS. GRISWOLD: Yes. Both parties have already filed stipulations in the Circuit so as to return jurisdiction to your Honor. The stipulations indicate that if the pleas are not accepted, that the appeals can be re-filed, but at this point they have been withdrawn.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Tarlowe, do you agree?

MR. TARLOWE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And Mr. Weddle, do you agree?

MR. WEDDLE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Weddle, given that, do I still need to review this paragraph with your client?

MR. WEDDLE: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Ahuja, at this time I would like you to tell me in your own words what it is that you did that makes you believe that you are guilty of Count Three in the indictment.

I will ask you this favor, sir. Again, just given the acoustics of this courtroom, I'll ask you, please, to speak into the microphone and to speak slower and louder than you think you need to, and you may begin when you're ready.

MR. TARLOWE: Your Honor, before Mr. Ahuja does that, I would note for the Court what I think will be apparent to your Honor, Mr. Ahuja is reading from a document that was prepared with the assistance of counsel, but does reflect Mr. Ahuja's own thoughts and words, and we also previously shared this with the government as well.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Ahuja, I actually was going to ask you that question. Let me just confirm, sir. Irrespective of who wrote these notes down, they are in fact your thoughts?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor, these are my thoughts.

THE COURT: I will hear them now. Thank you.

DEFENDANT AHUJA: In or about 2008, I co-founded Premium Point Investments, or PPI, where I served as chief executive officer and chief investment officer. As a member of PPI's investment committee, I was generally aware of the marks that were used to compute the net asset of PPI's funds. I also worked with others at PPI to report the net asset value to investors based on the marks provided by PPI's traders.

Beginning in or around the fall of 2015, I came to understand that there was a high probability that the net asset value of the New Issue Opportunity Fund was not being calculated through strict adherence by PPI's traders to PPI's valuation policy.

Despite having that understanding, I continued reporting the net asset value to investors and consciously failed to investigate the possibility of non-compliance with PPI's valuation policy in the New Issue Opportunity Fund.

As a result, between the fall of 2015 and early 2016, I was aware that there was a high probability that the net asset value of the New Issue Opportunity Fund was not being calculated and reported to investors in accordance with PPI's valuation policy, and I consciously avoided confirming that fact.

THE COURT: Sir, at the time that this was taking place, where were your offices located?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: On 56 and 5th.

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THE COURT: At the time that you engaged in this conduct, did you understand that what you were doing was wrong and illegal?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: I was aware. I was aware that there was a high probability that the NAV of the fund was being calculated in a way that was not consistent with the investors — what the investors had been told, and it was wrong for me not to follow—up on that.

THE COURT: Mr. Ahuja, may I understand that in the business of PPI and in the communications with investors, there were ways in which interstate commerce or interstate wires were implicated, either the use of wires to communicate this information, telephone calls, things of that nature or the use of national securities exchange?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Which of those, please?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Telephone and emails.

THE COURT: Mr. Tarlowe, do you know of any valid defense that would prevail at trial or any reason why your client should not be permitted to plead guilty?

MR. TARLOWE: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Griswold, are there additional questions that you would like me to ask of Mr. Ahuja?

MS. GRISWOLD: No, your Honor. We just note that we also believe it's proper that your Honor consider the entire

factual record before the Court, including the evidence at the prior trial in determining whether or not there is a sufficient factual basis for the plea.

THE COURT: It is precisely for that reason that unless the parties ask me to do so, I'm not going to ask the government to outline for me the evidence it would present at trial, because we have in fact seen that evidence. All right.

Mr. Ahuja, do you understand that as I consider whether there's a sufficient factual record for a guilty plea in this case, I may consider everything that you've said to me right now, and I may consider the evidence that was presented at trial?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Tarlowe, do you agree that there is a sufficient factual predicate for a guilty plea?

MR. TARLOWE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you know of any reason why I should not accept your client's plea of guilty?

MR. TARLOWE: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Griswold, do you agree that there is a sufficient factual predicate for a guilty plea by Mr. Ahuja to Count Three of the indictment?

MS. GRISWOLD: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: If he wishes to plead guilty, is there any reason why I should not accept it?

M4MBAHUP 1 MS. GRISWOLD: No, your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Mr. Ahuja, at this time do you wish to 3 enter a plea of quilty to Count Three of indictment S1:18 CR 328? 4 5 DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Thank you. You're both welcome to be 7 seated. Mr. Shor, at this time I would like to hear from you 8 9 with respect to what it is you did that makes you believe that 10 you are quilty of the offense charged in Count Three of the indictment. 11 12 May I ask, sir, do you also have notes to aid you in 13 speaking with me this morning? 14 DEFENDANT SHOR: I do. 15 THE COURT: Irrespective of who wrote them up, are 16 they your thoughts? 17 DEFENDANT SHOR: They are my thoughts. 18 THE COURT: I will ask you as I asked Mr. Ahuja, please be mindful of the acoustical limitations of this room 19 20 and to speak louder and slower than you think you need to, and 21 please speak when you are ready, sir. 22 DEFENDANT SHOR: Thank you, your Honor.

Between approximately April of 2014 and March of 2016,

I was a trader for the mortgage credit fund at Premium Point

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The month-end net asset value, or NAV, of the mortgage credit fund was an important measure of the fund's performance and was disseminated to investors and potential investors through the mail and interstate wire communications.

Beginning in or about the fall of 2015, as part of the month-end NAV calculation process, I obtained pricing data which resulted in an NAV I believed was too high.

I did two things which led to this result.

I pressured brokers to provide security specific marks which were higher than where I thought they should have been. I knew that brokers had an incentive to provide favorable marks to me in the hopes of obtaining business in the form of trades.

Second, I obtained sector spreads I knew would result in higher security specific prices, even though market bids for the securities were decreasing, by using PPI's mid-level pricing system, in which for some bonds half of the bid-ask was combined with the bid side marks as a lever.

I believe that the valuations conveyed to the investors exceeded my best estimate of the valuations for certain of the bonds I traded.

I participated in these efforts despite thinking they were wrong, and knowing that the increase valuations would be conveyed to investors and potential investors and relied upon Thank you, your Honor. them.

> Thank you, sir. THE COURT:

Mr. Shor, while you're standing, when you were having these conversations with brokers, when you were engaged in the process or your participation in calculating net asset values, were you located at least in part in Manhattan?

DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And you heard me ask Mr. Ahuja about whether wires, faxes, telephone calls, things of that nature, were implicated by the communications in which he was involved. In your communications with brokers, sir, regarding these net asset values or in the dissemination of these net asset values to investors, did that involve wires, emails, telephones, things of that nature, sir?

DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Weddle, do you know of any valid defense that would prevail at trial or any reason why your client should not be permitted to plead guilty?

MR. WEDDLE: There's no reason that my client should not be permitted to plead quilty, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Griswold, are there additional questions you would like me to ask of Mr. Shor?

MS. GRISWOLD: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Weddle, you heard Ms. Griswold say earlier that I might consider the trial record. I don't know that I need to because I believe that these allocutions suffice, but do you have a view as to my ability to do that

M4MBAHUP 1 here? 2 MR. WEDDLE: I agree that that is permitted, your 3 Honor. 4 THE COURT: Mr. Weddle, do you agree that there is a 5 sufficient factual predicate for a quilty plea in this case? MR. WEDDLE: I do, your Honor. 6 7 THE COURT: If your client wishes to plead guilty, is 8 there any reason why I should not accept it? 9 MR. WEDDLE: There is not, your Honor? 10 THE COURT: Ms. Griswold, the same two questions? 11 MS. GRISWOLD: No reason not to accept it, your Honor. 12 THE COURT: And there's a factual predicate? 13 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Of course. I should have asked you both questions. 15 Mr. Shor, at this time do you wish to enter a plea of 16 17 quilty to Count Three of indictment S1:18 CR 328? DEFENDANT SHOR: I do, your Honor. 18 19 THE COURT: Thank you, sir. You may be seated. 20 Mr. Ahuja and Mr. Shor, because you have acknowledged 21 that you are in fact quilty as charged in Count Three of the 22 indictment, because I am satisfied that you are aware of your 23 rights, including your rights, your respective rights to go to 24 trial and that you're aware of the consequences of your plea,

including the range of penalties or the sentence in this case

that may be imposed, I find that you are knowingly and voluntarily pleading guilty.

I am accepting your guilty pleas, and I am entering a judgment of guilty for each of you on Count Three of the indictment. It is my understanding that the parties today wish to proceed to sentencing.

Mr. Tarlowe, is it sufficient for me to say that you and your client have reviewed the presentence investigation report in this case. You are asking for the guidelines in that report to be recalculated to reflect the acceptance of responsibility credit, and that otherwise there's nothing else to discuss with respect to the presentence investigation report?

MR. TARLOWE: Yes, your Honor. I think that's all correct, yes.

THE COURT: Let me try and break it down because I don't want to be confusing, you'll all let me know if these are things that you think we simply do not have to discuss, but we've had a sentencing. There is a PSR.

Mr. Tarlowe, may I question your client specifically on this?

MR. TARLOWE: Yes, of course, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Ahuja, I've used the term "presentence investigation report or PSR," do you know what I was speaking of?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you recall reviewing it previously in this case?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: I believe the parties are asking me to recalculate the guidelines in light of the acceptance of responsibility credit that you and Mr. Shor have each become entitled to as a result of these guilty pleas. I understand that those will be changed, but do you have any other objections to the presentence investigation report?

DEFENDANT AHUJA: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Tarlowe?

MR. TARLOWE: Your Honor, this is probably unnecessary, but I think the only thing I just wanted to add is that to the extent we objected previously to certain findings in the presentence report, we're now waiving those objections; however, we recognize that the Court has already ruled on those, has already previously calculated the guidelines, and we have no objection to the Court relying on those prior findings and the prior guidelines calculation with the one adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Weddle, do you feel the same?

MR. WEDDLE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

And, Mr. Weddle, may I speak with Mr. Shor?

MR. WEDDLE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Shor, in our prior sentencing proceeding there was a presentence investigation report that was prepared. You recall our discussions about it. We've had — there were legal arguments and other arguments. You recall as well in the prior sentencing that I made certain findings about the presentence investigation report. Do you have that recollection, sir?

DEFENDANT SHOR: I do, your Honor.

THE COURT: What I'm being asked to do now as a consequence of the guilty plea I've just taken from you and from Mr. Ahuja, is to modify my guidelines calculation to reflect the acceptance of responsibility, but otherwise I'm not planning on making further adjustments to the presentence investigation report, except to the extent they relate to the calculation of the guidelines. Your prior objections are what they were.

Are there any additional objections that you make to the presentence investigation report, sir

DEFENDANT SHOR: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Then accept as modified. I am adopting the presentence investigation report for each defendant as previously done. I will simply change the guidelines to reflect the acceptance of responsibility.

Ms. Griswold, I spoke with you earlier about a statement in connection with sentencing. I should also have asked you whether the government has any objections. I know you've read the presentence investigation report. I imagine that you agree with my reflection of acceptance credit. Are there any other objections or modifications to the presentence investigation report?

MS. GRISWOLD: Just one modification. I think throughout it makes reference to Counts One through Four, and it doesn't impact the guidelines calculation, but I think it could be noted that the portions of the presentence report that talk about the four counts and the convictions on the four counts should be modified to note that the conviction here and the sentence is just for Count Three.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Tarlowe and then Mr. Weddle, I believe the government's asking me to modify the presentence investigation report to make clear that the conviction about which we are speaking today is the product of today's guilty plea and not the trial?

MR. TARLOWE: We agree it makes sense to do that, your Honor.

MR. WEDDLE: We agree as well, your Honor.

THE COURT: I'll do what I can to make that clear.

Thank you.

Ms. Griswold, may I hear from you or from your colleague in connection with sentencing?

MS. GRISWOLD: Yes, I believe Mr. Gitner will speak.

MR. GITNER: Thank you, your Honor.

I intend to be brief and non-controversial. I do want to thank your Honor for obviously paying very careful attention to the submissions in this case. I feel a little silly saying that frankly because I know your Honor pays careful attention to everything that comes before you, but I think it's worth saying out loud in the context of this case.

And I also want to thank defense counsel for their engagement in the discussions that led to where we are today, and frankly the manner in which they engaged with us. I also wanted to say that out loud.

As your Honor indicated at the beginning of this proceeding, we're sort of — this is a somewhat not very unique posture that we're in. But despite that uniqueness as with all cases, the resolution we believe should send the message that we stand behind the prosecution and the strong message that its already set.

The uniqueness and the unique posture of the case, which includes, frankly amount other things, in fact the substantial restitution that has already been paid, allows for this disposition. It brings finality through acceptance of responsibility, which we always take very serious of course.

It brings very serious felony convictions to the core of the conduct alleged here. It preserves needed resources which are now pointed elsewhere, including within the private fund space and elsewhere, and we believe it uniquely does all of this within and consistent with Section 3553(a).

So again, thank your Honor for the careful way you've considered this matter right up to this moment. Frankly, that said, I'll sit down and allow the proceeding to continue. We stand by the prosecution.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Mr. Tarlowe, do you or does one of your colleagues wish to speak in connection with sentencing?

MR. TARLOWE: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: May I speak directly with your client?

MR. TARLOWE: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Ahuja, if you wish to speak with me in connection with your sentencing, you are invited to do so.

You're not obligated to do so.

I do recall having spoken with you in connection with the prior sentencing, and I do feel over these several years that I do have a sense of you and this case.

If you would like to speak, you're invited. If you prefer not to, simply let me know that.

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Given the circumstances, I prefer not to speak.

M4MBAHUP THE COURT: Of course. 1 Mr. Weddle, is there anything you or your colleague 2 3 would like to say in connection with sentencing? 4 MR. WEDDLE: May I have a moment, your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Of course. 6 MR. WEDDLE: Just very briefly, your Honor, and I 7 think to in a way echo in mirror image the statement made by the prosecution, we do appreciate our ability to discuss the 8 9 matter with them and reach what I think is a result that 10 permits all the parties to essentially close the door on this 11 case. 12 We stand behind the way that we litigated this case 13 throughout and the defense, but we agree that this is a fair 14 resolution that should be accepted by your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Shor, at this time if you wish to 15 speak with me in connection with your sentence, you are invited 16 17 to do so. You are not obligated to speak with me, sir, and I 18

do recall our discussions at the prior sentencing proceeding, but I want to give you that opportunity if you'd like to speak.

DEFENDANT SHOR: Thank you, your Honor. I couldn't possibly be as eloquent as Mr. Weddle. Thank you.

THE COURT: I'm sure he appreciates that.

Thank you, sir.

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DEFENDANT SHOR: Otherwise, I don't wish to say anything, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

My practice usually is to take a break at this time having heard from the parties so that I can reflect appropriately on what has been argued because I do not come out on the bench with a sentence in mind. Perhaps the defendants in this case will recall that that is what I did with respect to their sentencings, and then I will usually come out and discuss with each defendant my rationale for the sentence imposed and my hopes for their future.

We keep saying this is an unusual case. This is an unusual case. There was a trial. There was extensive proceedings on both sides of that trial, including extensive sentencing proceedings, where I think all arguments that could be made were made. And then there were of course the posttrial, post-conviction proceedings that brought us to where we are today, and so I don't think it is useful to take a break.

I did want to say something. I'm still not sure what to say, so you'll excuse what comes out. I've had this case for four years and many of you, including in particular Mr. Ahuja and Mr. Shor, have had the case for far longer. And many times in the past period of years, we've all worked very, very hard, and we've done so, at least for some of us, because we believe in the criminal justice system. We believe in the fairness of the process that is in place, and perhaps it may be

that folks who are a party to this proceeding are or are not fully satisfied with this resolution.

I do have confidence and comfort that everyone working on this case has worked for justice and fairness. And to the extent you've done that, you've succeeded and you have confirmed the fairness of the process. Some of you will appear before me again in the future. Some of you I hope, Mr. Ahuja Mr. Shor, will not.

I've learned something through this case, and I hope that you have as well, and I hope that you can find some satisfaction in what you've learned through this case. And with that, I will turn to the formal process of sentencing.

I will describe the sentence I intend to impose, but give each time an opportunity to make legal objections before the sentence is actually imposed.

I have considered as I must the factors set forth by Congress in Section 3553(a), and they include the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of each of the defendants, the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, to provide a just punishment for the offense, to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, to protect the public from further crimes by the defendant, to provide each defendant with needed educational and vocational training, medical care or other correctional treatment in the most

effective manner.

I must consider the guidelines, and I've mentioned that a few moments ago. I must consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities, among similarly situated defendants. And I need in some cases, though not in this one because of other proceedings, to consider restitution to the victims.

I mentioned earlier my guidelines calculations in this case. For Mr. Ahuja, they are an offense level — an adjusted offense level of 36, a criminal history category of I, a resulting guideline range of 188 to 235 months.

With Mr. Shor, there's an offense level of 32. A criminal history category of I, and resulting guidelines range of 121 to 151 months.

The parties have proposed to me an agreed upon sentence that includes a sentence of time served, no imposition of a term of supervised release, no fine, no forfeiture and no restitution, and I am agreeing with each of the agreed upon sentences to be imposed on each of Mr. Ahuja and Mr. Shor.

There was much reflection in coming to this decision, and I did solicit additional briefing on the parties on the propriety of such sentencings. I appreciate very much the materials that you sent to me to give me insight that I was missing into what is an appropriate sentence.

And so my intention is to vary downward and to impose

on each of Mr. Ahuja and Mr. Shor sentences of time served with no term of supervised release to follow, with no fine, no forfeiture, and no restitution, but with the single \$100 mandatory special assessment that I cannot avoid the imposition of.

I say that there is no restitution, but as each side knows from the plea agreement, there were extensive restitution efforts in connection with sentencing and thereafter. And so to say there's no restitution is a little bit -- I don't mean it to be misleading. It has been addressed in other proceedings.

Ms. Griswold, is there any reason why I may not impose that sentence on each of Mr. Ahuja and Mr. Shor?

MS. GRISWOLD: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Tarlowe.

MR. TARLOWE: No, your Honor. The only thing is that I believe that Mr. Ahuja paid the special assessment after the first sentencing.

THE COURT: I will not make him pay -- to be clear, and I know you all know this, if you've paid it already, you do not have to pay it again. I have that out there because I didn't know if it was paid.

MR. TARLOWE: Just to be clear, I believe it was paid, but maybe if we could just say to the extent it's been paid, that we'll get credit of what's already been paid.

THE COURT: I completely agree.

MR. TARLOWE: And hopefully we won't ask for a refund.

THE COURT: I'll leave it to you to figure out the other counts. You deal with the Clerk's Office on that.

Mr. Weddle, the same?

MR. WEDDLE: I believe the same is true, and we'll ask for a refund.

THE COURT: Mr. Weddle, the larger question is, is there any legal reason why I may not impose this sentence?

MR. WEDDLE: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Ahuja and Mr. Shor, please rise.

Gentleman, after thinking about this Section 3553(a) factors and the sentencing guidelines as they apply to your respective cases, and after thinking as well about the arguments that have been made to me by your attorneys and by the attorneys for the government in connection with sentencing, I have calculated the guidelines as I have. I have adopted the presentence investigation reports as modified, and I am imposing for each of you a sentence of time served with no term of supervised release to follow, with no fine, with no forfeiture, no additional restitution, additional to that you've already arranged to pay, and with an obligation to pay \$100 special assessment to the extent that you have not paid that already.

Mr. Ahuja, do you understand the sentence that I have

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DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Shor, do you understand the sentence I have imposed?

DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Gentleman, please be seated.

To the extent that you have not waived this in any plea agreement that you may have with the government, you have the right to appeal from your conviction and from your sentence. If an appeal is something in which you are interested, please speak with your attorneys because they understand the process by which appeals are taken.

We've talked about this previously, there is generally a two-week period after the filing of the written judgment for the filing of the notice of appeal. I imagine the written judgment will be filed sometime early next week, but it may take a little bit longer.

So if appeal is something in which you're interested, you'll please speak with your attorneys.

Mr. Ahuja, do you understand that

DEFENDANT AHUJA: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Shor, do you understand that?

DEFENDANT SHOR: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Griswold, does the government move to

dismiss the open counts and the underlying counts?

MS. GRISWOLD: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Motion to dismiss is granted.

Ms. Griswold, is there anything else we should be addressing in today's proceeding?

MS. GRISWOLD: May I have a moment, your Honor?

THE COURT: Of course.

MS. GRISWOLD: No, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you very much to all of you.

Mr. Tarlowe, from your client's perspective, is there anything else -- or Mr. Finzi, from your perspective, is there anything else to address in today's proceeding?

MR. FINZI: One housekeeping matter, your Honor. We have conferred with the government about having our client's passport returned. And one sort of touching aspect of what's otherwise a very solemn proceeding, my client had made peace with the fact that he would never see his father again in India. Now that he's able to, he intends to travel there on Monday, so we've made a request to the government to get the passport back as soon as possible.

MS. GRISWOLD: I'm working on it, your Honor. I have been speaking with pretrial. And now that I know the right officer, I'm hoping we can get it back today.

THE COURT: Do you need anything from me? You have an oral order to get it.

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               MS. GRISWOLD: I will come if I need more back up, but
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      I think I will be able to track it down today.
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               THE COURT: Reach out to my chambers, to
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     Mr. Patterson, if you need anything from me.
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               MS. GRISWOLD: Thank you.
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               THE COURT: Mr. Finzi, I thank you.
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               But other than that, sir, which I certainly do hope is
      resolved today, anything else you'd like me to know?
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               MR. FINZI: No, your Honor. Thank you.
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               THE COURT: Mr. Weddle?
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               MR. WEDDLE: No, nothing, your Honor.
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               THE COURT: All right. I don't know that there's
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      anything else to say. We've seemed to have said a lot today.
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      I wish you all well. We are adjourned.
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               (Adjourned)
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